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The main contribution of this study is the determination of an endogenous threshold of 
institutional quality, beyond which external debt would affect economic growth differently. 
The focus is on 14 countries of the African Franc zone over the period 1985-2015. Based on 
the panel Smooth Threshold Regression model, the results reveal that the relationship 
between external debt and economic growth is based on institutional quality. It is found that 
the level of indebtedness at which the effect of external debt on economic growth becomes 
negative is higher in countries with lower levels of corruption and high levels of democracy. 
This means that poor institutional quality prevents a country from taking full advantage of its 
credit opportunities. Thus, the more countries become democratic, the more debt helps 
finance economic growth. These results are robust to sensitivity analysis and Generalized 
Method of Moments estimation.  




The external debt of developing economies has always been one of the main concerns of 
the international economy. Its generalization, the constant trend towards its increase and the 
number of actors involved in the problem are indeed a source of great concern. This is due to 




For several decades, the economic literature on the subject has focused on the correlation 
between external debt and economic growth, identifying threshold effects of the level of 
external debt (Kourtellos et al., 2013). Several authors, including Krugman (1988) and Sachs 
(1989) have long supported the thesis that there is a critical debt threshold, beyond which a 
country's external debt generates adverse effects on its overall economy. In other words, when 
debt levels are above critical debt thresholds, economic growth is likely to be negatively 
impacted due to a depression in private and public investment. The work of Pattillo et al. 
(2002) in a cross-sectional study of 93 developing countries from 1969 to 1998 showed that, 
on average, a country’s external debt had negative effects on economic growth when it 
exceeded a critical threshold of 160-170 percent of exports, or 35-40 percent of its GDP. 
Before reaching this threshold, public debt generates a priori positive externalities on 
economic growth.  
Most recent economic studies agree that the level of debt is a key variable in the analysis of 
the debt-economic growth relationship. However, given the heterogeneity of countries' levels 
of development (industrialized countries, middle-income countries, low-income countries), 
we propose to analyze the role of the quality of their political institutions on the debt-
economic growth relationship. We defend the idea that institutional factors (democracy, 
political stability) can prove to be determining factors and themselves become sources of 
threshold effects (Cadoret et al., 2014).  
Thus, the objective of this paper is to analyze the effect of external debt on economic growth, 
conditional on the quality of political institutions. We seek to estimate the threshold of the 
quality of political institutions at which external debt would contribute more to economic 
growth in the African Franc zone, a zone characterized (a priori) by a low quality of 
democracy (Polity IV, Freedom House) and privileged from the point of view of financing 
(Beah, 2015). The originality of this study lies in the simultaneous consideration of political-
institutional variables (democracy, political stability, etc.), but also in the use of one of the 
techniques of non-linear model econometrics in the specific context of African countries in 
the Franc zone. No study, to our knowledge, provides information on this issue as suggested 
by Kourtellos et al. (2013). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology and an 




2. Methodology and data 
2.1.Methodology 
For our estimates, we will use the Panel Smooth Threshold Regression (PSTR) method of 
Gonzalez et al. (2005). This is a generalization of threshold effects of Hansen (1999). In our 
case, the transition variable is the quality of political institutions and the specification of the 
model to be estimated takes the following form:  
GROWTHit=µi+a1Debtit+a2DebtitГ(qit,c)+a3Xit+εit 
2.2.data 
The data used come from the World Development Indicators Database (WDI, 2017), 
with the exception of data on institutional quality from the Polity IV, Freedom House and 
ICRG databases. The sample covers the period 1985-2015 (31 years) and includes 10 
countries in the African Franc zone1. 
 
3. Presentation of the results of the PSTR model 
The results of the PSTR estimation of the relationship between external debt and 
economic growth using institutional quality as a transition variable are presented below. First, 
we present the results of the non-linearity and number of regimes tests. Next, we present the 
results of the estimates followed by our comments. Finally, we proceed with the robustness 









                                                             
1Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Congo, IvoryCoast, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo. 
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Table 1: Fisher's LM Test 
Transitional variables   LMF Test P-Value 
Political stability 
Corruption 
Socio-economic conditions  
Democracy (ICRG) 
Quality of laws 
Democracy (Polity IV) 








   0.001*** 
 0.04** 
    0.001*** 
   0.001** 
          0.05* 
          0.76 
    0.001*** 
 Source: authors from WinRats. H0: linear model VsH1: PSTR model with at least one threshold. 
***Significance at 1%; ** Significance at 5% and * Significance at 10%. 
 
The null hypothesis that the model is linear is rejected for the transition variables, with the 
exception of the Polity IV democracy variable. The alternative hypothesis of a non-linear 
relationship is therefore accepted. Thus, a PSTR model can be used to estimate this 
relationship, after choosing between the PESTR (Panel Exponential Smooth Transition 
Regression) and PLSTR (Panel Logistic Smooth Transition Regression) model families. The 
selection test is presented in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2: Fisher Selection Test: Choice between PESTR and PLSTR 
Transitional variables PLSTR  PESTR  
 
Corruption 
             F stat         P-value 
H01       0.4754279    0.6224 
H02       1.2163263    0.2986 





 F stat          P-value 
H01        4.684942     0.0100 
H02        9.247581     0.0001 
H03       19.727416    0.0000 
 
Socio-economic conditions  
 F stat         P-value 
H01       2.8199100    0.0616 
H02       5.0352773    0.0072 
H03       1.6236514    0.1994 
 
Democracy (ICRG) 
    F stat         P-value 
H01        8.035633    0.0000 
H02       20.910370    0.0000 
H03        4.329223     0.0054 
Quality Of Laws F stat         P-value 
H01       0.8549131    0.3560 
H02       0.5589963    0.4553 
H03       0.4723377    0.4925 
 
Democracy (Polity 2) F stat         P-value 
H01       10.488013    0.0014 
H02        1.356550    0.2454 
H03        1.434187    0.2323 
 




Once the linearity test and the test of the choice between PESTR and PLSTR have been 
performed, we identify the number of transition functions. The methodology of the F-statistic 
LMF sequential test is generally used for the residual non-linearity test (Number of regimes 
test). We find that the one-threshold model (two regimes) adequately captures the non-linear 
relationship.  Table 3 presents the estimates of the PSTR model using the non-linear least 
squares method. 
Table 3: External Debt, Institutions, and Economic Growth 
 
 
















































       












       

























       






































       
Source: authors from WinRats. 
 
The slope appears to be low for 04 transition variables (the highest value is 0.881 for political 
stability). It is concluded that there is a gradual transition, implying that a PSTR model is well 
suited. This means that depending on these variables, the relationship between external debt 
and growth cannot be reduced to a limited number of regimes. We find that the lag between 
the two extreme regimes occurs around the location parameter c (the four location parameters 
seem far from their respective mean values). We conclude that only countries with good 
institutions can effectively exploit the benefits of external debt for economic growth. 





These results show that economic growth is less sensitive to external debt in countries with 
weak institutions. We find a direct negative and unstable impact (with values between -
348.59, and -0.04) of public debt on growth, measured by a2 and insignificant in 3 regressions 
(corruption, political stability and socioeconomic conditions). This result is consistent with 
the empirical literature which shows that there is a negative relationship between external debt 
and economic growth for highly corrupt and/or politically unstable countries (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1993; Cadoret et al., 2014). 
However, we find a positive and unstable direct impact (with values between 0.05 and 0.16) 
of the external debt on growth in 3 regressions (democracy, quality of laws and political 
regime). This result suggests that the more the country becomes more democratic, the better 
the debt finances economic growth. Overall, these results show that the level at which the 
effect of debt on growth becomes negative is higher in countries with less corruption and a 
high level of democracy, meaning that poor institutional quality prevents a country from 
taking full advantage of its credit opportunities. This result is similar to the findings of the 
Jalles (2011). Moreover, for all transition variables, we find that the external debt ratio a1 is 
unstable. This implies that an increase in the transition variables leads to an increase in the 
external debt coefficient. Thus, in countries with a high institutional level, there is a positive 
effect of public debt on economic growth. This result, so far, confirms the idea that good 
institutions (e.g. a high level of democracy and governmental stability) are considered one of 
the main factors for maximizing growth in African countries in the Franc zone. It is 
emphasized that the quality of institutions influences the level of external debt and, 
consequently, economic growth. 
 
For robustness control, a dynamic panel model using the generalized moment method (GMM) 
seems appropriate. However, one of the conditions for using GMM is that N>T, for this 
purpose, this study uses the five-year average of each of the variables listed above except for 
the initial level of real per capita income (first year of five years).The robustness control 
confirms the results obtained from the PSTR Model in terms of sign and significance of all 
the control variables (see Table 4). With regard to our variable of interest, i.e. the external 
debt, the GMM estimate shows on the one hand that it is significant and positive. On the other 
hand, the combined effect is negative and significant for the institutional variables, with the 
exception of government stability, which means that the influence of external debt on 
economic growth depends on the quality of institutions. 
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Table 4: Estimated GMM Model coefficients 
 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Corruption 
 




Quality of  laws Democracy 
























































































































Number of countries 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Instruments 5 5 5 5 5 5 
AR(2) 0.573 0.473 0.936 0.475 0.610 0.994 
Sargan test 0.267 0.136 0.284 0.355 0.200 0.438 
Source: authors from Stata 15. Note: The dependent variable is the real GDP growth rate. ***Significance at 1%;** Significance at 5% 




This paper analyzed the impact of political institutions on the external debt-economic growth 
relationship in the African Franc zone using the PSTR Model (Panel Smooth Threshold 
Regression), completed by the GMM in system to control the robustness of the results. The 
results obtained show that the institutional environment affects the external debt-economic 
growth relationship. The effect of external debt is negative for countries with low quality 
institutions. Moreover, the more countries become more democratic, the more debt tends to 
finance economic growth. Estimation by the GMM method confirms the results obtained and 




















Appendix 1: descriptive statistics of the variables (1985-2015) 
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Political stability 310 7,41 2.206 2.33 11.08 
Corruption 310 6.57 1.57 2 9.5 
Socio-economic 
conditions  
310 2.535 4.742 -8.703 49.998 
Democracy 
(ICRG) 
310 2.83 2.818 0 8 
Quality of laws 310 2.57 0.705 1 4 
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